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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, two uniquely American experiences so grossly offended 
an individual right that a bitterly divided Supreme Court had to step 
in.  Foreigners scoff at the idea of electing judges.  Nor do they ap-
prove of heavy financial contributions to campaigns.  Certainly no 
other country cloaks the right to give money with the maximum pro-
tection accorded by law the way our Constitution does with the First 
Amendment.  When these factors all play out in a story that makes for 
a best-selling novel, then there are fireworks, public outrage, and, as 
the Chief Justice lamented, a chance to make bad law.1  Fortunately, 
there is an evenhanded jurisprudential principle that courts may dis-
patch to referee the showdown in future cases. 
Judicial elections began to gain popularity in the mid-nineteenth 
century “as part of the Jacksonian movement toward greater popular 
control of public office.”2  By the Civil War, over half of the states 
elected their judges,3 and today thirty-nine states elect all or part of 
their judiciary.4  As many as eighty-seven percent of all state judges 
face an election of some kind.5  As judicial elections have transformed 
from dignified low-key affairs into polarized political contests,6 critics 
like Sandra Day O’Connor have launched prominent efforts to per-
suade states to eliminate the practice of judicial elections.7  Some 
states appear to be listening8 for good reason.  Take the words of 
 
 1 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2272 (2009) (citing the legal aphor-
ism “hard cases make bad law” to describe extreme cases that test the boundaries of estab-
lished legal principles). 
 2 Terri R. Day, Buying Justice:  Caperton v. A.T. Massey:  Campaign Dollars, Mandatory Recusal 
and Due Process, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 359, 363 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Randall T. Shepard, Electing Judges and the Impact on Judicial Independence, 42 TENN. B. J. 22, 
23 (2006). 
 5 Id. 
 6 As the Chief Justice of Indiana noted, “judicial elections are progressively looking more 
like elections in the executive and legislative branches.”  Id. 
 7 See Bill Mears, Former Justice O’Connor Leads Push to End Judicial Elections, CNN.COM (Dec. 
15, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/15/judicial.elections/index.html (re-
porting that Sandra Day O’Connor seeks reform in election-based judicial systems as they 
raise doubts regarding a judge’s impartiality). 
 8 See, e.g., John Schwartz, Efforts Begun to Abolish the Election of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 
2009, at A12 (reporting that Nevada and Ohio are considering changes to their judicial 
selection process). 
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Richard Neely, an elected justice of West Virginia, for example, who 
once wrote, “[a]s long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from 
out-of-state companies to injured in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to 
do so.  Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give someone else’s 
money away, but so is my job security.”9 
Enter the 2009 Supreme Court decision, Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Co.10  At a minimum, Caperton exposes the pitfalls of judicial elec-
tions and calls into question the reach of the Due Process Clause in 
protecting a litigant’s right to a fair tribunal before a fair judge.  Dis-
cussed in more detail below, the case involved the refusal of a state 
supreme court justice to recuse himself, where a litigant who later 
had an appeal pending before the justice spent over three million 
dollars to support the justice’s campaign.  The Supreme Court held 
that because there was an objective appearance of bias, due process 
required recusal.  Caperton has reignited the debate over judicial elec-
tions and the circumstances where a judge must recuse himself to 
avoid violating the Due Process Clause, with the media,11 politicians,12 
academics,13 interest groups,14 judges,15 and lawyers16 all weighing in. 
A review of the Supreme Court’s recusal jurisprudence reveals the 
need for a due process test that balances constitutional concerns 
while taking into account the expanding role of the Due Process 
 
 9 Small Steps:  The Road to Prosperity Runs Through the Judiciary, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 
2010, at 29. 
 10 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
 11 See Caperton v. Massey Resource Page, JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN (Jan. 13, 2011), 
http://www.justiceatstake.org/resources/in_depth_issues_guides/caperton_resource_
page/index.cfm (showing news anchor on CNN discussing debate regarding judicial elec-
tions). 
 12 See Erica Peterson, WV Politicians React to Supreme Court Decision, W. VA. PUB. 
BROADCASTING (June 8, 2009), http://www.wvpubcast.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=9950 (re-
porting the reactions of West Virginia Governor Joe Manchin and Senator Jeff Kessler to 
the Supreme Court decision). 
 13 See Caperton v. Massey Coal and the Recusal of State Court Judges, C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY 
(Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/291663-1 (showing panel discus-
sion of academics at Georgetown University Law Center regarding Caperton and its ef-
fects). 
 14 See Caperton v. Massey, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (June 8, 2009),  
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/caperton_v_massey/ (reporting the 
reaction of interest group leaders, such as the president of the American Bar Association 
and the executive director of Justice at Stake). 
 15 See Ed Brayton, Michigan Leaders React to Caperton Ruling, THE MICH. MESSENGER (June 
10, 2009), http://michiganmessenger.com/20664/Michigan-leaders-react-to-caperton-
ruling (showing the positive reaction of Chief Justice Marilyn Kelly of the Michigan Su-
preme Court). 
 16 See Steve Foley, WV Legal Experts React to Caperton v. Massey Ruling, THE MINORITY REPORT 
(June 8, 2009), http://www.theminorityreportblog.com/blog_entry/steve_foley/2009/
06/08/ (reporting the reaction of several attorneys to the Caperton ruling). 
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Clause in mandating recusals.  Beginning from the common-law, 
which required a direct pecuniary interest, the Court has gradually 
extended the requirement of recusal to include cases with less than 
direct financial interests, cases where previous judicial appearances 
had created a conflict, and most recently where there is an objective 
appearance of bias.  
This Article argues that given Caperton’s push in this jurisprudence 
and the constitutional freedoms it now potentially sweeps, when as-
sessing motions for recusals, courts should use the careful Mathews v. 
Eldridge test to assess whether there has been a violation of due 
process.  This is good policy because Mathews confronts the tension 
between the First Amendment and procedural due process, while 
containing the scope of Caperton, all without sacrificing its principles.  
And, as explained below, given the test’s linear structure, applying 
Mathews to recusal motions based on traditional pre-Caperton con-
cerns would not change the analysis. 
Part I provides an overview of the Due Process Clause and when it 
requires recusal of judges.  It starts by outlining the many applica-
tions of due process, then focuses on procedural due process, specifi-
cally when it requires judicial recusal.  It details a series of cases, cul-
minating in Caperton, that consider judicial recusal.  With this 
background, Part II examines the boundaries of the First Amend-
ment as they relate to judicial elections, addressing the controversial 
proposition that recusals do not burden speech.  Part III then argues 
that given the complications that Caperton has added to the due 
process jurisprudence, applying the Mathews test is not only in line 
with the Court’s precedence, but it makes for good policy:  It would 
contain Caperton, alleviating the dissenter’s concerns, while taking in-
to account the concerns that drove the majority’s decision. 
II.  WHEN DUE PROCESS DEMANDS RECUSAL 
A.  Overview of Due Process 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides 
that  
[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileg-
es or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
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nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.17  
This language has been interpreted to protect both the substantive 
and procedural rights of individuals.18  Specifically, as one federal 
court recently explained, the Due Process Clause operates in three 
primary ways19:  (1) it incorporates many provisions of the Bill of 
Rights against the States;20 (2) it bars certain government action that 
affects certain substantive rights “regardless of the fairness of the pro-
cedures used to implement them”;21 and (3) it guarantees fair proce-
dures.22 
With regard to the guarantee of fair procedures—commonly re-
ferred to as procedural due process—courts closely scrutinize state 
action that has the effect of depriving an individual of “life, liberty, or 
property.”23  The Supreme Court has found such violations in many 
 
 17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“Pro-
cedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive indi-
viduals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”).  The Due Process Clause is derived from the 
Magna Carta, which read in relevant part:  “No freemen shall be taken and imprisoned or 
disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, 
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”  MAGNA CARTA, § 
XXXIX (1215), available at http://www.constitution.org/eng/magnacar.htm; see also 
Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819) (“As to the words from 
Magna Charta [sic], incorporated into the constitution . . . after volumes spoken and writ-
ten with a view to their exposition, the good sense of mankind has at length settled down 
to this:  that they were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the 
powers of government . . . .”). 
 18 See, e.g., Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 431 (6th Cir. 2002) (“This Clause 
clothes individuals with the right to both substantive and procedural due process.”) (cita-
tion omitted). 
 19 See Fieger v. Ferry, No. 04-60089, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71274, at *16–18 (E.D. Mich. 
Sept. 26, 2007) (“The Due Process Clause provides three types of protections.”); see also 
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . is the source of three different kinds of 
constitutional protection.”). 
 20 This is the rationale behind § 1983 claims.  See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 
(1990) (“First, the [Due Process] Clause incorporates many of the specific protections de-
fined in the Bill of Rights.”). 
 21 Id. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).  This substantive guarantee 
extends to many areas of law.  See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) 
(privacy); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 392 (1923) (education in foreign languages). 
 22 See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332 (explaining that procedural due process prevents gov-
ernment from freely depriving individuals of liberty of property). 
 23 An interesting question of state action arises in the context of prison facilities operated by 
private contractors.  For example, in Correctional Services Corporation. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 
61, 71 (2001), the Court decided that the holding of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which recognized an implied private ac-
tion for violations of constitutional rights, did not extend to private correctional facilities.  
In doing so, the Court assumed that due process is required in privatized correctional in-
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contexts,24 including administrative action,25 the reach of a state’s 
extraterritorial jurisdiction,26 and the procedures accompanying the 
issuance of a writ of garnishment.27  Regardless of the context in 
which a procedural due process violation is alleged, the Court applies 
a two-step analysis.  The first step is determining whether the state has 
in fact deprived an individual of a protected interest—life, liberty, or 
property.28  A deprivation of a protected interest, however, is not itself 
unconstitutional;29 rather, once the court has found a deprivation of a 
protected interest, the second step is to determine whether the state 
deprived the individual of that interest without due process of law.30  
Put another way, a constitutional violation will arise only if the Court 
finds that the state deprived the individual of that interest without 
due process of law.31  Therefore, a procedural due process violation is 
independent of the merits of the underlying claim.32 
 
stitutions, but did not decide the question.  See also Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 
412 (1997) (concluding that “private prison guards, unlike those who work directly for 
the government, do not enjoy immunity from suit in a § 1983 case”). 
 24 See Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 269 (1991) (not-
ing that procedural due process is implicated by, for example, “disciplining prisoners and 
school children, suspending drivers’ licenses and welfare benefits, terminating employ-
ment and parental rights, curtailing public programs, prosecuting public offenders, and 
compelling public access to beachfront property”). 
 25 Compare Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385–386 (1908) (requiring notice and 
an opportunity to be heard in actions where site-specific taxes are irrevocably fixed) with 
Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (stating 
that general statutes that affect taxes do not require notice and an opportunity to be 
heard). 
 26 See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (holding that due process 
prevents a state from making binding judgments against “defendant[s] with which the 
state has no contacts, ties, or relations”). 
 27 See, e.g., N. Ga. Fishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975) (holding that is-
suance of writs of garnishment must not violate due process). 
 28 The Court has struggled to define this step.  For instance, in Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 
918 (1951) (per curiam), the Court applied what has later been termed the 
“right/privilege” distinction.  See PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN & BYSE’S 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:  CASES & COMMENTS 774–83 (10th ed. 2003).  The Court seemed to 
retreat from this standard in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 
(1972), where the Court defined the liberty and property interest in more specific terms.  
See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972) (moving further away from the en-
titlement analysis of Bailey v. Richardson); William Van Alstyne, Cracks in “The New Proper-
ty”:  Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 484 (1977) 
(criticizing the Court’s definition of property interests). 
 29 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259–60 (1978). 
 30 Id. at 259 (noting that procedural due process is meant to protect against the “mistaken or 
unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property” (emphasis added)). 
 31 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1989) (“[T]he constitutional violation actiona-
ble . . . is complete when the wrongful action is taken.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 32 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330–31 (1976) (noting that the respondent’s “consti-
tutional challenge is entirely collateral to his substantive claim of entitlement”). 
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The question of what procedures due process demands is not easi-
ly answered.  As the Supreme Court has noted, due process “is not a 
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place 
and circumstances.”33  To this end, the Court applies a variety of tests 
to determine the appropriate level of process.  In the administrative 
context, as well as select other areas,34 the Court applies a balancing 
test.35  This test was borne out of the so-called “procedural due 
process revolution” of the 1970s,36 which began with the watershed 
case of Goldberg v. Kelly.37  In Goldberg, the Supreme Court held that 
New York City deprived welfare recipients of due process by not pro-
viding them with a hearing prior to terminating their welfare bene-
fits.38  Whatever uncertainty was created by Goldberg—and much un-
certainty was created—it was resolved by the Supreme Court in 
Mathews. 
The Mathews test requires courts to balance three factors:  
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, in-
 
 33 Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (quoting Joint An-
ti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162–63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring)); Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (quoting the same sentence from 
Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) 
(“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular sit-
uations demands.”); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, 367 U.S. at 895 (“The very nature of 
due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every 
imaginable situation.”).  Nonetheless, note that it is clear that at its core, procedural due 
process requires notice and opportunity to be heard.  See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333, 348–49 
(noting that both notice and the opportunity to be heard are fundamental to due 
process); see also People v. David W., 733 N.E.2d 206, 211 (N.Y. 2000) (noting that the 
“bedrock of due process is notice and opportunity to be heard”) (citing, inter alia, Ma-
thews, 424 U.S. at 333; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265–68 (1970); Mullane v. Cent. 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). 
 34 See discussion infra notes 199–202 and accompanying text. 
 35 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35 (formulating an analysis of due process weighing the pri-
vate interest, risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest, and the government interest 
at stake). 
 36 See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1273 (1975) (noting 
that “we have witnessed a greater expansion of procedural due process in the last five 
years than in the entire period since ratification of the Constitution”); Timothy Zick, 
Statehood as the New Personhood:  The Discovery of Fundamental “States’ Rights,” 46 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 213, 252 n.177 (2004) (charting the major cases in the establishment of proce-
dural due process). 
 37 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 38 See id. at 261–71 (discussing the private interest in retaining welfare benefits, the govern-
ment interest in promoting citizens’ sufficiency and dignity, and the administrative costs 
of pre-termination hearings). 
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cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.39 
One important area where procedural due process operates to 
limit government action is judicial recusals.40  Although nearly every 
jurisdiction has a statute that requires recusal in certain situations,41 
courts have used procedural due process to limit the prerogative of 
judges to hear every case that may come before them.  That is, fun-
damental fairness (and thus due process) demands that a judge re-
cuse herself in certain situations.42  These decisions are an outgrowth 
of the constitutional maxim that “[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a 
basic requirement of due process.”43 
B.  Early Recusal Challenges 
The Due Process Clause does not “impose a constitutional re-
quirement that the states adopt statutes that permit disqualification 
for bias or prejudice.”44  In fact, as the Supreme Court has stated, “on-
ly in the most extreme cases would disqualification” be constitutional-
ly mandated.45  At its most basic level, the Due Process Clause incor-
porates the common-law rule that recusal is required when a judge 
has a “direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest” in a case.46  As 
the Supreme Court has noted, this common-law rule is derived from 
the maxim that “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; 
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not im-
 
 39 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 40 See Caperton v. A..T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (citing, inter alia, Tumey v. 
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 
 41 See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION:  RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF 
JUDGES (2d ed. 2007). 
 42 See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257 (“Under our precedents there are objective standards that 
require recusal when ‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-
maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’” (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47)). 
 43 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); see also Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259 (discussing 
Murchison); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (“The requirement of neu-
trality has been jealously guarded by this Court.”); Friendly, supra note 36, at 1279–80 
(noting that an unbiased tribunal is essential to a fair hearing).  The Supreme Court has 
further observed that “[t]he theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an opinion 
cannot be impartial.”  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878).  Put another 
way, an accused has the right to be tried by “a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion, 
excitement, and tyrannical power.”  Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236–37 (1940). 
 44 Fieger v. Ferry, No. 04-60089, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71274 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2007) 
(citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986)). 
 45 See Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 821 (requiring disqualification of a state supreme court justice 
where the disposition of the matter before the court would affect that justice’s interest in 
a separate legal action). 
 46 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). 
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probably, corrupt his integrity.”47  Yet as discussed in the text that fol-
lows, the Supreme Court has gradually expanded this common-law 
rule over the last century to require recusal based on due process in 
new situations. 
The first departure from the common-law came in 1927 when the 
Supreme Court decided the case of Tumey v. Ohio.48  In that case, the 
Court held that Due Process was violated where the salary of a town’s 
mayor, who also served as town justice, was tied to the amount of 
fines he imposed and where sums from criminal fines were deposited 
into the general village treasury.49  In the face of a challenge, the 
Court held that this arrangement violated the Due Process Clause 
“both because of his [the individual’s] direct pecuniary interest in the 
outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and to gradu-
ate the fine to help the financial needs of the village.”50  Specifically, 
the Court held: 
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average 
man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the de-
fendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and 
true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of 
law.51 
In so holding, the Court departed from the narrow common-law 
focus on direct pecuniary interest.  Instead, the decision sought to 
protect against those interests that might attempt adjudicators to 
“disregard neutrality.”52  Indeed, as the Supreme Court recently ex-
plained, the due process violation in Tumey “was less than what would 
have been considered personal or direct at common law.”53  In a 
number of subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court further defined 
and expanded the reach of Tumey.54 
 
 47 See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259; Gutierrez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 428 (1995) (quoting 
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 48 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
 49 Id. at 524–24. 
 50 Id. at 535. 
 51 Id. at 532. 
 52 See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260 (noting that the Tumey Court examined conflicts of inter-
est beyond financial involvement in a case). 
 53 Id. at 2259–60. 
 54 In Ward v. Village of Monroeville, for instance, the Court, in facts similar to Tumey, invali-
dated a system whereby a town mayor would impose fines that went to the town’s general 
treasury.  409 U.S. 57 (1972).  Although the mayor had no direct, personal interest in as-
sessing a fine, the Court reasoned that a “judge’s financial stake need not be as direct or 
positive as . . . in Tumey.”  Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260 (internal citation omitted).  In a lat-
er series of cases, the Court held that it is permissible for the trial judge to have been in-
volved in some earlier proceedings in the case.  See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 
58 (1975) (noting that issuing arrest warrants and presiding over arraignments does not 
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In a second series of cases, the Supreme Court further expanded the 
reach of the Due Process Clause, once again departing from the 
common-law of recusal.  These cases “emerged in the criminal con-
tempt context, where a judge had no pecuniary interest in the case 
but was challenged because of a conflict arising from his participation 
in an earlier proceeding.”55  In In re Murchison,56 a trial judge charged 
a defendant with contempt after the defendant refused to answer the 
judge’s questions; the judge also charged another individual with per-
jury for failing to answer the judge’s questions truthfully.57  After the 
trial, the very judge that charged both individuals also convicted 
them.58  The defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court set aside 
their convictions as violative of Due Process.59 
Although recognizing that the standard for disqualification “can-
not be defined with precision,” the Court held that in this case, 
“[h]aving been a part of that [one-man grand jury] process a judge 
cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the 
conviction or acquittal of those accused.”60  The Court reasoned that 
“[a]s a practical matter it is difficult if not impossible for a judge to 
free himself from the influence of what took place in his ‘grand-jury’ 
secret session.”61  The Court distinguished this from ordinary grand 
jury proceedings, because here the jury was part of the accusatory 
process.62 
Next, the Court in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania63 considered whether 
the trial judge who would be sentencing convicted defendants may 
also preside over their criminal contempt charges, for contempt 
committed against the same trial judge.  The Court held that “a de-
fendant in criminal contempt proceedings should be given a public 
 
preclude the trial judge from ultimately hearing the case, even though the judge had to 
make a preliminary determination of probable cause); cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 
475 U.S. 813, 822–23 (1986) (holding that a justice casting the deciding vote on a state 
high court to uphold a large punitive award while acting as lead plaintiff in the identical 
case below violated due process, although noting that “what degree or kind of interest is 
sufficient to disqualify a judge from sitting cannot be defined with precision”) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 55 See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2261. 
 56 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). 
 57 Id. at 134–35. 
 58 Id. at 135. 
 59 Id. at 139. 
 60 Id. at 137. 
 61 Id. at 138. 
 62 Id. at 137 (noting that “[a] single ‘judge-grand jury’ is even more a part of the accusatory 
process than an ordinary lay grand juror”). 
 63 400 U.S. 455 (1971). 
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trial before a judge other than the one reviled by the contemnor.”64  
As the Court reasoned, a judge in these circumstances “necessarily 
becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy.  No one so 
cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that calm detachment necessary 
for fair adjudication.”65 
C.  Recent Expansion of Due Process 
1.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. 
Perhaps the most significant expansion of due process with re-
spect to judicial recusals came in 2009.66 
In Caperton, the Court held that due process requires a judge to 
recuse herself when, based on “objective and reasonable percep-
tions,” there is a “probability of bias” by the judge towards one of the 
litigants.67  The facts leading up to the Supreme Court case began in 
2002, when a West Virginia state jury returned a verdict against A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., Inc. (“Massey”), finding it liable to Hugh Caperton, 
for $50 million in compensatory damages on a variety of tort theo-
ries.68  The trial court denied Massey’s post-verdict motions in 2004.69 
Having failed to receive relief at the trial court, Don Blankenship, 
Massey’s chairman, resorted to politics in an attempt to reverse the 
judgment against his company.  Before the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of West Virginia heard Massey’s appeal, Blankenship decided to 
support a local attorney, Brent Benjamin, who was campaigning to 
replace Justice McGraw of the Supreme Court.70  Blankenship not on-
ly contributed $1,000 to Benjamin’s campaign committee, but he also 
donated more than $2.5 million to a so-called “527” organization that 
opposed McGraw and supported Benjamin;71 this significant donation 
constituted more than two-thirds of the organization’s total fund-
 
 64 Id. at 466. 
 65 Id. at 465. 
 66 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2262 (2009) (“This problem arises 
in the context of judicial elections, a framework not presented in the precedents we have 
reviewed and discussed.”).  This latest modification to the Due Process recusal inquiry 
comes on the heels of Minnesota Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), which con-
sidered the First Amendment rights of judicial candidates to announce their views during 
a campaign for judicial office.  See infra Part III. 
 67 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263. 
 68 Id. at 2257.  The other defendants included Harman Development Corp., Harman Min-
ing Corp., and Sovereign Coal Sales.  Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
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raising.72  Blankenship also gave over $500,000 in independent ex-
penditures in support of Benjamin’s candidacy.73  As the Supreme 
Court noted, Blankenship’s contributions and expenditures “were 
more than the total amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters 
and three times the amount spent by Benjamin’s own committee.”74  
In the end, Benjamin won the 2004 judicial election, receiving 53.3% 
of the vote, defeating incumbent Justice McGraw who received 46.7% 
of the vote.75 
As Massey’s appeal reached the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia, Massey filed a motion to disqualify the newly-elected Justice 
Benjamin under both a state statute and the Due Process Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.76  The Court denied the motion.77  The appeal 
reached the high court in November 2007, and in a 3–2 ruling, the 
Court reversed the $50 million verdict against Massey in an opinion 
joined by Justice Benjamin.78 
The defendants sought a rehearing and moved for disqualifica-
tion of three of the five justices who ruled on the appeal.79  Two of the 
justices agreed to recuse themselves, while Justice Benjamin declined 
to do so,80 with one justice warning that “Blankenship’s bestowal of 
his personal wealth, political tactics, and ‘friendship’ have created a 
cancer in the affairs of this Court.”81  At the rehearing, Justice Benja-
min was acting as Chief Justice and selected two additional justices to 
hear the appeal.82  In April 2008, the high court once again reversed 
the jury verdict, relieving Massey of its $50 million tort liability.83  Jus-
 
 72 Id.  The organization was called “And for the Sake of Kids,” and was organized under 26 
U.S.C. § 527.  For background on so-called 527s, see generally Richard Kornylak, Note, 
Disclosing the Election-Related Activities of Interest Groups Through § 527 of the Tax Code, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 230 (2001). 
 73 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. 
 74 Id.  The petitioner in the Supreme Court further contended that “Blankenship spent $1 
million more than the total amount spent by the campaign committees of both candi-
dates combined.”  Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 2257–58 (finding “no objective information . . . to show that this Justice has a bias 
for or against any litigant, that this justice has prejudged the matters which comprise this 
litigation, or that this Justice will be anything but fair and impartial”) (internal citation 
and quotation marks omitted). 
 78 Id. at 2258.  The opinion was not unanimous.  For instance, Justice Starcher dissented, 
opining that the “majority’s opinion is morally and legally wrong.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 2262.  As the Court points out, Justice Benjamin wrote four separate opinions dur-
ing the course of the appeal detailing why no actual bias existed.  Id. at 2262–63. 
 81 Id. at 2258 (citation omitted). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
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tice Benjamin found himself in the 3–2 majority again with two Jus-
tices writing a scathing dissent:  “Not only is the majority opinion un-
supported by the facts and existing case law, but it is also fundamen-
tally unfair.  Sadly, justice was neither honored nor served by the 
majority.”84  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed.85 
After noting that the U.S. Supreme Court had not previously con-
sidered a recusal challenge in the context of judicial elections, the 
Court reiterated that the test is an objective one.86  That is, “the Due 
Process Clause . . . do[es] not require proof of actual bias.”87  In the 
context of judicial elections, the Court held that “there is a serious 
risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions—
when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a signifi-
cant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case 
by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the 
case was pending or imminent.”88  To define this test, the Court asked 
“whether, ‘under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and 
human weakness,’ the interest ‘poses such a risk of actual bias or pre-
judgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due 
process is to be adequately implemented.’”89 
Turning to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that Blan-
kenship’s campaign activities “had a significant and disproportionate 
influence” in placing Justice Benjamin on the case.90  This is evident, 
the Court reasoned, from the large amount of money that Blanken-
ship spent on this campaign.91  Although the Court conceded that 
Blankenship’s campaign activities might not have directly caused Jus-
tice Benjamin’s electoral victory, this was of little significance to the 
Court.  The size of Blankenship’s contributions relative to the total 
amount spent in the election, combined with the small margin of vic-
tory, allowed the Court to find that “[t]he risk that Blankenship’s in-
fluence engendered actual bias is sufficiently substantial that it ‘must 
be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately im-
 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 2267. 
 86 Id. at 2263 (“The difficulties of inquiring into actual bias, and the fact that the inquiry is 
often a private one, simply underscore the need for objective rules.”). 
 87 Id. (citing, inter alia, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986); Tumey v. 
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)). 
 88 Id. at 2263–64. 
 89 Id. at 2263 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1976)). 
 90 Id. at 2264. 
 91 Id. (comparing Blankenship’s monetary contributions to the total amount raised by the 
campaign). 
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plemented.’”92  The Court further noted the close temporal relation-
ship between the campaign contributions and the justice’s election 
such that it was “reasonably foreseeable” when Blankenship made the 
contributions that the appeal would come before Justice Benjamin if 
he won the election.93 
The Court concluded by opining that it was addressing “an ex-
traordinary situation,” and that its holding would not cause adverse 
consequences.94  Just as with previous decisions addressing extreme 
facts giving rise to recusal, the Court believed that lower courts are 
“quite capable” of applying the standard that it announced in the 
case.95  This is particularly true because state statutes often require re-
cusal above and beyond the constraints of due process that the Court 
was announcing.96 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a vigorous dissent, in which he argued 
that Caperton will “inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that 
judges are biased,” thus eroding the public’s confidence in the im-
partiality of the judiciary.97  After explaining how the Court has de-
parted from its prior precedents, the Chief Justice posed forty ques-
tions to highlight the uncertainties that he believed would result from 
the majority’s holding.98  In the end, the Chief Justice predicted that 
the Court will “regret” this decision because lower courts will expand 
its boundaries, “each claiming the title of ‘most extreme’ or ‘most 
disproportionate’ [facts].”99 
Justice Scalia also dissented, arguing that “the principal conse-
quence of today’s decision is to create vast uncertainty” in the thirty-
nine states that elect their judges.100  He predicted the rise of the “Ca-
perton claim” and the indeterminate law that will have to be applied 
when adjudicating such claims.101  Justice Scalia also lamented that 
the decision will reinforce the public perception that litigation is 
simply a game.102  In this case, Justice Scalia believes “the relevant 
 
 92 Id. (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47). 
 93 Id. at 2264–65. 
 94 Id. at 2265. 
 95 Id. at 2266. 
 96 Id. at 2267 (“Because the codes of judicial conduct provide more protection than due 
process requires, most disputes over disqualification will be resolved without resort to the 
Constitution.  Application of the constitutional standard implicated in this case will thus 
be confined to rare instances.”). 
 97 Id. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 98 Id. at 2269–72. 
 99 Id. at 2273. 
100 Id. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
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question . . . is whether we do more good than harm by seeking to 
correct this imperfection through expansion of our constitutional 
mandate in a manner ungoverned by any discernable rule.”103 
2.  Scope of Caperton and Boundaries of Due Process 
Caperton has fundamentally changed the interplay between judi-
cial recusals and the Constitution.  Given the significance of Caperton 
and the questions it leaves open, the boundaries of the decision are 
unclear, and lower courts may interpret the case as an invitation to 
require recusal in an even greater number of situations.104 
As a preliminary matter, courts interpreting Caperton will undoub-
tedly struggle with framing the facts of the actual case.  On the one 
hand, the facts have the “feel of a best seller,”105 not only because they 
did make for a best seller—John Grisham’s “The Appeal”—but also 
because they ooze corruption and unfairness.  In the Court’s own 
words they are “extreme,” “extraordinary,” “rare,” and “exception-
al.”106  On the other hand, both the majority and the public may have 
exaggerated the facts.107 
And even on the undisputed facts, as Chief Justice Roberts points 
out, it is unclear as to how extreme they really are.108  Blankenship 
had contributed to other candidates in the past, which the dissenters 
found “undercut[] any notion that his involvement in this election 
was ‘intended to influence the outcome’ of particular pending litiga-
tion.”109  His only direct contribution amounted to $1,000, and his in-
dependent expenditures were not so outlandish when compared to 
what other lawyers, in aggregate, spent on Benjamin’s opponent.110  
 
103 Id. at 2275. 
104 See Richard M. Esenberg, If You Speak Up, Must You Stand Down:  Caperton and its Limits, 
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1287 (2010) (arguing that the scope and likely application of the 
decision “can be informed by the Court’s recent decisions on judicial campaign speech 
and campaign finance regulation”); Stephen M. Hoersting & Bradley A. Smith, The Ca-
perton Caper and the Kennedy Conundrum, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 319, 319 (2009) (noting that 
the Caperton standard is a “largely unworkable standard for judicial recusal”). 
105 Joan Biskupic, At the Supreme Court, a Case with the Feel of a Bestseller:  Like a Grisham Novel, 
W.Va. Dispute Examines Conduct of Elected Judges, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2009, at 1A. 
106 See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263, 2265, 2267. 
107 See Hoersting & Smith, supra note 104, at 322–23 (“The press depiction of the Caperton 
facts is enough to horrify anyone who believes in impartial justice.  It is also completely 
incorrect.”). 
108 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2273 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
109 Id. at 2274. 
110 Id. at 2273–74 (“Blankenship’s independent expenditures do not appear ‘grossly dispro-
portionate’ compared to other such expenditures in this very election.  ‘And for the Sake 
of the Kids’—an independent group that received approximately two-thirds of its funding 
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The dissenters were also unconvinced that money made the differ-
ence in this election—Benjamin’s opponent may have been brought 
down by his lack of endorsements, refusal to participate in debates, 
and a disturbing speech.111  And he lost by a healthy margin (seven 
points), suggesting that Blankenship’s money was not the deciding 
factor.112 
The holding of the case is no less controversial.  It raises questions 
like “[h]ow much money is too much money?” or “[w]hat level of 
contribution or expenditure gives rise to a ‘probability of bias?’”—two 
of the more than forty questions asked by the dissent.113  But the more 
fundamental issue is whether Caperton is even limited to money.  
Reading the holding out of context, the answer seems to be “yes”: 
We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias . . . when a person 
with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and dispropor-
tionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or di-
recting the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or im-
minent.  The inquiry centers on the contribution’s relative size in comparison 
to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent 
in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the 
election.114 
The majority seems particularly troubled by the possibility of one 
of the litigants buying her own judge.115  The underpinning of the 
holding, however, is broader than financial contributions; the prob-
lem that the court attempts to redress in Caperton is the objective 
“probability of bias.”116  Indeed, to reach its conclusion, the Court 
builds on the “principles” set out in a handful of cases for the sole 
purpose of highlighting the fundamental problem of judicial bias (ra-
ther than just influence through financial incentives).117  Revealingly, 
none of those cases involved direct contributions and one—In re Mu-
 
from Blankenship—spent $3,623,500 in connection with the election.  But large inde-
pendent expenditures were also made in support of Justice Benjamin’s opponent.  ‘Con-
sumers for Justice’—an independent group that received large contributions from the 
plaintiffs’ bar—spent approximately $2 million in this race.  And Blankenship has made 
large expenditures in connection with several previous West Virginia elections, which un-
dercuts any notion that his involvement in this election was ‘intended to influence the 
outcome’ of particular pending litigation.”) (citations omitted). 
111 Id. at 2274. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 2269. 
114 Id. at 2263–64 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
115 Id. at 2265 (“Just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias 
can arise when—without the consent of the other parties—a man chooses the judge in his 
own cause.  And applying this principle to the judicial election process, there was here a 
serious, objective risk of actual bias that required Justice Benjamin’s recusal.”). 
116 Id. at 2263. 
117 Id. at 2262. 
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chison—had nothing to do with money.118  Of course, Supreme Court 
precedent always develops to encompass different circumstances and 
factual scenarios.  But given Caperton’s focus on the probability of bi-
as, litigants in the courtroom of a judge who had been elected in 
“significant” part and as a result of “disproportionate” support from 
crusaders against the litigants, would have a plausible claim stemming 
directly from the holding of the case.119 
This would not require a particularly robust interpretation of Ca-
perton.  As the dissenters point out, it logically flows from the holding 
that “there are a number of factors that could give rise to a ‘probabili-
ty’ or ‘appearance’ of bias:  friendship with a party or lawyer, prior 
employment experience, membership in clubs or associations, prior 
speeches and writings, religious affiliation, and countless other consid-
erations.”120  Chief Justice Roberts is alarmed by how broad the major-
ity’s holding seems to be.  As the Chief Justice wrote:  “[T]he stan-
dard the majority articulates—‘probability of bias’—fails to provide 
clear, workable guidance for future cases.  At the most basic level, it is 
unclear whether the new probability of bias standard is somehow li-
mited to financial support in judicial elections, or applies to judicial 
recusal questions more generally.”121 
If there was any doubt as to whether recusal claims based on the 
judge’s speech as a candidate could plausibly be entertained, Chief 
Justice Robert’s list of questions seems to put that notion to rest: 
9. What if the case involves a social or ideological issue rather than a fi-
nancial one?  Must a judge recuse from cases involving, say, abortion 
rights if he has received “disproportionate” support from individuals who 
feel strongly about either side of that issue?  If the supporter wants to 
help elect judges who are “tough on crime,” must the judge recuse in all 
criminal cases? . . . 20.  Does a debt of gratitude for endorsements by 
newspapers, interest groups, politicians, or celebrities also give rise to a 
constitutionally unacceptable probability of bias?  How would we meas-
ure whether such support is disproportionate?122 
These uncertainties arise partly because the majority emphasizes the 
“extremeness” of the case,123 with the hope that courts will not be 
 
118 Id. at 2261. 
119 Id. at 2264 (finding that the campaign efforts “had a significant and disproportionate in-
fluence in placing Justice Benjamin on the case”).  It is worth noting that the speech 
would not have to be the necessary or sufficient factor in the judge’s victory.  See id. 
120 Id. at 2268 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
121 Id. at 2269 (emphasis added). 
122 Id. at 2269–70. 
123 Id. at 2272 (“To its credit, the Court seems to recognize that the inherently boundless 
nature of its new rule poses a problem.  But the majority’s only answer is that the present 
case is an ‘extreme’ one, so there is no need to worry about other cases.  The Court re-
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flooded with non-meritorious Caperton claims,124 but says nothing 
about limiting it to financial contributions.  It is not difficult to im-
agine a “speech” Caperton claim that is more “extreme” than one in-
volving a miniscule financial contribution. 
Even if the Court did try to limit the holding to instances involv-
ing financial contributions, expecting lower courts to be selective in 
applying the rule in only “extreme” cases is not realistic—and may 
indeed be “just so much whistling past the graveyard.”125  The history 
of federal jurisprudence abounds with examples of the Court setting 
out rules borne out of some “extreme” cases only to see it grow in the 
district courts.126  The dissent provides one such “cautionary tale,”127 
but there are others.  For instance, in 2007 the Supreme Court came 
down with its Bell Atlantic v. Twombly decision that raised the pleading 
standard in certain antitrust actions.128  Although the decision ap-
peared to be limited to the antitrust context, many lower courts 
quickly seized upon its holding as grounds to raise the pleading stan-
 
peats this point over and over.  (‘this is an exceptional case’); (‘On these extreme facts’); 
(‘Our decision today addresses an extraordinary situation’); (‘The facts now before us are 
extreme by any measure’); (Court’s rule will ‘be confined to rare instances’).”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
124 Id. at 2266 (majority opinion) (“As such, it is worth noting the effects, or lack thereof, of 
the Court’s prior decisions.  Even though the standards announced in those cases raised 
questions similar to those that might be asked after our decision today, the Court was not 
flooded with Monroeville or Murchison motions.  That is perhaps due in part to the ex-
treme facts those standards sought to address.  Courts proved quite capable of applying 
the standards to less extreme situations.”). 
125 Id. at 2272 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
126 See id. (“There is a cost to yielding to the desire to correct the extreme case, rather than 
adhering to the legal principle.  That cost has been demonstrated so often that it is cap-
tured in a legal aphorism:  ‘Hard cases make bad law.’”). 
127 The Court summed it up as follows:   
 Consider the cautionary tale of our decisions in United States v. Halper and Hud-
son v. United States.  Historically, we have held that the Double Jeopardy Clause on-
ly applies to criminal penalties, not civil ones.  But in Halper, the Court held that a 
civil penalty could violate the Clause if it were ‘overwhelmingly disproportionate to 
the damages [the defendant] has caused’ and resulted in a ’clear injustice.’  We 
acknowledged that this inquiry would not be an ‘exact pursuit,’ but the Court as-
sured litigants that it was only announcing ‘a rule for the rare case, the case such 
as the one before us.’ 
 Just eight years later, we granted certiorari in Hudson ‘because of concerns 
about the wide variety of novel double jeopardy claims spawned in the wake of 
Halper.’  The novel claim that we had recognized in Halper turned out not to be so 
‘rare’ after all, and the test we adopted in that case—‘overwhelmingly dispropor-
tionate’—had ‘proved unworkable.’  We thus abandoned the Halper rule, ruing 
our ‘ill considered’ ‘deviation from longstanding double jeopardy principles.’ 
  Id. at 2272–73 (citations omitted). 
128 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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dard in other types of cases.129  Only two years later, after much uncer-
tainty in the lower courts,130 the Supreme Court decided Ashcroft v. Iq-
bal, which held that Twombly’s heightened pleading standard is gen-
erally applicable in federal court.131 
Whether “Caperton motions” for recusals based on the judicial 
candidates’ platforms will be readily granted as a matter of straight 
application of Caperton, or because the holding is not explicitly li-
mited to financial contributions, or because there is seldom unifor-
mity in the application of new standards to the “rare” circums-
tances—whatever the reason may be, the distinct possibility that 
courts will have to deal with a “variety of Caperton motions,” looms 
large.132  Only with the application of a careful balancing test articu-
lated in Mathews can the Court be sure that Caperton affords adequate 
due process protection to the litigant in a potentially biased cour-
troom without sacrificing the confidence in our judicial system or the 
candidates’ First Amendment rights.133 
 
129 See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) (“However, the [Twombly] Court’s 
explanation for its holding indicated that it intended to make some alteration in the re-
gime of pure notice pleading that prevailed in the federal courts ever since Conley v. Gib-
son, was decided half a century ago.”); Leading Cases, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, Civ-
il Procedure:  Pleading Standards, 121 HARV. L. REV. 305, 305 (2007) (arguing that a “judicial 
opinion is the wrong forum for enacting a major change to settled interpretations of the 
Federal Rules,” as the Court did in Twombly). 
130 Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences:  Shockwaves in the Lower Courts after 
Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 852 (2008) (“Because Twombly 
is so widely cited, it is particularly unfortunate that no one quite understands what the 
case holds.”). 
131 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950–51 (2009). 
132 See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2273. 
133 Id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“It is an old cliché, but sometimes the cure is worse 
than the disease.  I am sure there are cases where a ‘probability of bias’ should lead the 
prudent judge to step aside, but the judge fails to do so.  Maybe this is one of them.  But I 
believe that opening the door to recusal claims under the Due Process Clause, for an 
amorphous ‘probability of bias,’ will itself bring our judicial system into undeserved dis-
repute, and diminish the confidence of the American people in the fairness and integrity 
of their courts.  I hope I am wrong.”).  To be sure, the Supreme Court, in Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010), characterized Caperton as being 
“limited to the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant’s political speech 
could be banned.”  This statement does not speak directly to the First Amendment rights 
of judges, but to the extent it seeks in dicta to cabin the holding of Caperton, lower courts 
and litigants may nonetheless seize upon the language and ambiguities of the decision in 
the various ways described throughout this Article. 
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III.  FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON RECUSAL 
A.  First Amendment Rights of Judicial Candidates 
Just as the Due Process Clause protects the right of litigants to a 
fair tribunal, the First Amendment protects the judicial candidates’ 
freedom of speech.134  It is worth noting at the outset that (as the con-
troversial recent Supreme Court decision reaffirmed) the First 
Amendment includes the right to give money.135  More relevant for 
this discussion, however, is the idea that the amendment also protects 
the right to receive money.136  If the Supreme Court or the circuit 
courts agree, then the argument in this section that there are press-
ing First Amendment concerns in recusal cases is even more forceful.  
But because this paper focuses on recent Supreme Court case law, 
where specific First Amendment considerations have been recog-
nized, the discussion that follows centers on judicial candidates’ 
speech.  In a landmark decision, Republican Party v. White, the Su-
preme Court held that a state may not prohibit judicial candidates 
from explaining their views on disputed legal issues.137  To be sure, 
judicial recusals are different from state canons that directly regulate 
speech.  Nevertheless, as a result of White, even mandatory recusals, 
with their potential to chill speech, give rise to First Amendment con-
cerns. 
Like most states, Minnesota had judicial conduct canons, which 
were based on the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.138  At issue 
in White was Minnesota’s “announce clause” that stated that “a candi-
date for a judicial office, including an incumbent judge . . . shall 
not . . . announce his or her views on disputed legal or political is-
sues.”139  The controversy arose when Gregory Wersal, running for as-
sociate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, distributed literature 
in which he criticized several decisions of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court.140  After a complaint was filed with the agency responsible for 
prosecuting ethical violations of judicial candidates, Wersal withdrew 
from the race.141 
 
134 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). 
135 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917 (2010). 
136 See Dean v. Blumenthal, 577 F.3d 60, 69–70 (2d. Cir. 2009). 
137 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
138 Id. at 768. 
139 See MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CANON 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (1998). 
140 White, 536 U.S. at 765. 
141 Id. at 769. 
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Not to be deterred, Wersal ran again two years later, this time 
seeking an advisory opinion from the agency on whether it planned 
to enforce the announce clause.142  The agency’s response was equi-
vocal:  Although it had doubts about the constitutionality of the pro-
vision, it was unable to answer Wersal’s inquiry because he did not 
submit a list of announcements that he would be making.143  Wersal 
subsequently filed a lawsuit in federal court that culminated in the 
White decision.144 
The Supreme Court was careful in limiting its holding to the an-
nounce clause, which was separate from the clause that prohibited 
candidates from making promises other than “faithful and impartial 
performance of the duties of the office” (the “pledge” or “promise” 
clause).145  The Court’s interpretation of the announce clause, howev-
er, was more expansive than what the Minnesota Supreme Court, the 
District Court, and the Eighth Circuit offered.146  The Court con-
cluded that the clause prohibited a candidate “from stating his views 
on any specific nonfanciful legal question . . . except in the context of 
discussing past decisions—and in the latter context as well, if he ex-
presses the view that he is not bound by stare decisis.”147 
Because the announce clause was a content-based regulation of 
speech and also burdened a category of speech that is at the core of 
what the First Amendment protects, the Court applied strict scruti-
ny.148  Without deciding whether impartiality is a compelling inter-
est,149 or indeed even what interest was advanced by the state, the 
 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 770 (“All the parties agree this is the case, because the Minnesota Code contains a 
so-called ‘pledges or promises’ clause, which separately prohibits judicial candidates from 
making ‘pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial 
performance of the duties of the office’—a prohibition that is not challenged here and 
on which we express no view.”) (citation omitted); see also Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. 
v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm’n, 388 F.3d 224, 227 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Although the Su-
preme Court’s decision in White applied only to an announce clause and did not involve a 
promises and commit clause, the district court found that the difference in this case is 
simply one of label:  [T]he State has enforced the promises and commit clause as a de fac-
to announce clause, and therefore the State is unlikely to succeed in light of the binding 
precedent in White.”). 
146 White, 536 U.S. at 771–72. 
147 Id. at 773. 
148 Id. at 775. 
149 Courts interpreting White have since found that judicial impartiality can be a compelling 
goal.  See, e.g., Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2007) (“An impartial judi-
ciary, while a protean term, translates here as the state’s interest in achieving a courtroom 
that at least on entry of its robed judge becomes a neutral and disinterested temple, in 
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Court held that the announce clause was not narrowly tailored to any 
goal that could rise to the level of compelling.150  Quite simply, the 
state was regulating speech based on its content, which in the eyes of 
the majority has little to do with impartiality.151  As the Court ex-
plained,  
[W]hen a case arises that turns on a legal issue on which the judge (as a 
candidate) had taken a particular stand, the party taking the opposite 
stand is likely to lose.  But not because of any bias against that party, or 
favoritism toward the other party.  Any party taking that position is just as 
likely to lose.  The judge is applying the law (as he sees it) evenhanded-
ly.152 
While the majority opinion clearly left the door open for lower 
courts to find that judicial impartiality is a compelling interest, it has 
provided little guidance on how a state canon’s restriction on speech 
can ever be narrowly tailored.  A federal appellate court has sug-
gested one answer.  In Jenevein v. Willing, a state judge facing public 
pressure over his refusal to withdraw from a case, chose to don his 
robe and hold a press conference in his courtroom.153  The commis-
sion in charge of investigating ethical charges issued a censure order 
against the judge.154  The Fifth Circuit held that the order could only 
survive strict scrutiny if it censured the judge for using state equip-
ment, his robe, and the courtroom instead of a public forum:  “Today 
we say only that the state can put the courtroom aside.”155  The com-
mission, however, went over the line by directing the order at the 
content of the judge’s speech.156 
Perhaps the most forceful and memorable lines of White came 
from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence.  A critic of judicial elections, 
Justice O’Connor observed that Minnesota “has voluntarily taken on 
the risks to judicial bias” by instituting the practice of popularly elect-
ing judges.157  As one court summarized O’Connor’s argument, “the 
state cannot . . . attempt to have it both ways by electing its judiciary 
yet simultaneously gagging its judicial candidates and thus preventing 
 
appearance and fact—an institution of integrity, the essential and cementing force of the 
rule of law.  That this interest is compelling cannot be gainsaid.”). 
150 White, 536 U.S. at 776–77. 
151 Id. at 776. 
152 Id. at 776–77. 
153 Jenevein, 493 F.3d at 561. 
154 Id. at 560. 
155 Id. at 561. 
156 Id. at 562. 
157 See White, 536 U.S. at 792. 
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the voting public from receiving the information necessary to cast an 
informed vote.”158 
One of the questions purposefully left open by White is whether 
the commit or pledge clauses also run afoul of the First Amend-
ment.159  No consensus exists either among state or federal courts on 
whether these regulations are like the announce clause struck down 
in White and therefore unconstitutional.160 
Even if appellate courts or the Supreme Court ultimately limit 
White to announce clauses, uncertainty remains over “how, and 
whether, this new freedom can coexist with the goal of maintaining a 
fair, independent, and impartial judiciary.”161  Armed with White, can-
didates are free to criticize decisions of judges against whom they are 
running—criticism that may be steeped as much in populism as in 
the law or legal process.  One commentator provides a particularly 
pointed view of a world in the wake of White: 
Instead of reciting platitudes about how they will be fair and efficient, 
judicial candidates will now have to engage each other and stake out dis-
tinct positions.  They will have to develop campaign platforms, essential-
ly, against which voters can compare their judicial records once elected.  
Fueled by rising levels of funds, high-profile advertisements will transmit 
the candidates’ messages and the assessments of interested groups to 
more people.  Voter turnout should rise.  Retention rates should fall.162 
Judicial candidates are not the only ones armed with a new found 
freedom; interest groups around the country have filed “right to lis-
 
158 Family Trust Found. of Ky. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 704 (E.D. Ky. 2004). 
159 White, 536 U.S. at 770. 
160 See Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Celluci, 521 F. Supp. 2d 351, 387 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (pledge and 
commit clauses are narrowly construed and constitutional); North Dakota Family Al-
liance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1044 (D.N.D. 2005) (pledge and commit 
clauses are similar in scope to the announce clause and unconstitutional); In re Kinsey, 
842 So.2d 77, 86–87 (Fla. 2003) (pledge and commit clauses are different from the an-
nounce clause and constitutional); Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 196 P.3d 1162, 1170 
(Kan. 2008) (citing Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm’n, 388 
F.3d 224, 227 (6th Cir. 2004) (pledge and commit clauses are similar in scope to the an-
nounce clause and unconstitutional)); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2003) (pledge 
clause is different from the announce clause and constitutional). 
161 Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 163 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Robert H. Alsdorf, 
The Sound of Silence:  Thoughts of a Sitting Judge on the Problem of Free Speech and Judiciary in a 
Democracy, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 197, 200 (2003); Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake 
of White:  How States are Responding to Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How 
Judicial Elections are Changing, 38 AKRON L. REV. 625, 629 (2005); Nancy Gertner, To Speak 
or Not to Speak:  Musings on Judicial Silence, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1147, 1148 (2004); David 
Shultz, Minnesota Republican Party v. White and the Future of State Judicial Selection, 69 
ALB. L. REV. 985, 986 (2006)). 
162 David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 297 (2008). 
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ten” suits stemming from the questionnaires they have sent to candi-
dates running for state court judgeships.163 
When candidates have refused to fill out forms that ask them to 
announce their views on politically-charged legal questions, like the 
right to abortion, these groups have pointed to state canons as the 
reason for their refusal.164  Whether these canons are indeed the per-
petrators—or saviors—is less than clear, to say the least.165  For some 
time, third party groups have run into what may have stricken them 
as a judicially-imposed formality, called standing:  “[T]o maintain a 
‘right to listen’ claim, a plaintiff must clearly establish the existence 
of a ‘willing speaker’ . . . [because] [i]n the absence of a willing 
speaker, ‘an Article III court must dismiss the action for lack of stand-
ing.’”166  But this wall may too be crumbling.  In a 2008 decision of 
Kansas Judicial Review v. Stout, where a past judicial candidate claimed 
to have been this willing speaker who was discouraged to fill out a 
questionnaire because of the canons restricting his speech, the Tenth 
Circuit found that the interest group that circulated the question-
naire had standing.167 
From a legal standpoint, however, White’s reach should not be 
overstated; in 2008, the Court, in a unanimous decision, has refused 
 
163 See Black, 489 F.3d at 164 (citations omitted).  Interest groups’ interest in these question-
naires was not unpredictable, even if the number of the “right to listen” lawsuits is a bit 
jarring.  See Pozen, supra note 162, at 300 (“The rapid rise in campaign spending, the ag-
gressive outreach done by interest groups and political parties, and the politicization of 
campaign speech have transformed many judicial races from sleepy, low-key affairs into 
high-stakes, high-salience affairs.  They have broken down the traditional regulatory, sty-
listic, and rhetorical barriers distinguishing judicial elections from other elections.  Judi-
cial candidates increasingly invoke their beliefs on abortion, same-sex marriage, tort 
reform, and other controversial issues; if they do not proactively do so, interest groups may try to 
ferret them out through questionnaires.”) (emphasis added); Barbara E. Reed, Tripping the Rift:  
Navigating Judicial Speech Fault Lines in the Post-White Landscape, 56 MERCER L. REV. 971, 
981 (2005). 
164 Black, 489 F.3d at 164 (discussing why judges are reluctant to answer questionnaires on 
political issues). 
165 See Ind. Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 507 F.3d 545, 548 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that of 
the candidates who explained why they did not respond to a questionnaire asking for the 
views on Roe v. Wade, most explained that they did not rely on the canons, but either felt 
it professionally or personally inappropriate to respond); Terry Carter, Loaded Question-
naires?  Judicial Candidates Advised to Be Wary of Answers Inviting Suits Challenging Canons, 5 
ABA J. E-REPORT 3 (2006) (arguing that the reason why candidates choose to be silent 
may well be professional views that judges ought to guard their political views). 
166 Black, 489 F.3d at 166–67 (quoting Competitive Enter. Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 856 
F.2d 1563, 1566 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); see also Shepard, 507 F.3d at 550; Alaska Right to Life v. 
Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 2007) (addressing an interest group’s claim that its 
decision to not circulate a questionnaire because of the canons was an inappropriate re-
striction of speech and dismissing the claim for lack of ripeness). 
167 519 F.3d 1107, 1115 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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to use—indeed even consider—White as a sword to cut through the 
nominating process of judicial candidates in New York.168  A candi-
date may have the right to speak, but, as it turns out, no guarantee 
that anyone would listen.  The Second Circuit, in Lopez Torres v. New 
York State Board of Elections,169 drew on and distinguished White to strike 
down the process by which political parties, given their clout, were ef-
fectively choosing state judges.170  The Supreme Court, without citing 
White, overturned the Second Circuit, limiting the candidate’s associ-
ational right not to join, while observing that the First Amendment 
does not call on the courts to manage the marketplace of ideas “by 
preventing too many buyers from settling upon a single product.”171  
The fact that being chosen by a political party in New York was, for all 
practical purposes, the only way to guarantee an audience for your 
speech, had nothing to do with the First Amendment.  As the court 
observed, it “says nothing more than that the party leadership has 
more widespread support than a candidate not supported by the lea-
dership.”172  Nonetheless, White’s impact on judicial elections is signif-
icant:  So long as a state chooses to hold popular elections for judges, 
White continues to protect candidates’ speech. 
B.  Recusal as Burdening Speech 
Limiting a judicial candidate’s or a sitting judge’s speech through 
a judicial canon similar to the one at issue in White is, of course, not 
the same as discouraging comments made by judges through the im-
plicit threat of mandatory recusals.  To be sure, speech would still be 
burdened, if not forbidden, on the basis of its content.  And, if it were 
made in the course of a campaign, discussing qualifications, that 
speech is at the core of the First Amendment protection.173  But both 
the process and consequences are different:  The regulation is indi-
rect because the speech itself is not prohibited—only presiding over a 
case at a later date is—and the result is a potential disqualification 
 
168 N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 196 (2008) (holding that New 
York’s system of choosing party nominees for the State Supreme Court does not violate 
the First Amendment). 
169 Id. 
170 Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 183, 201 (2d Cir. 2006), rev’d, 
552 U.S. 196 (2008). 
171 See Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 208. 
172 Id. at 205. 
173 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002) (deeming speech about the 
qualifications of candidates for public office to be “at the core of our First Amendment 
freedoms”). 
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from a case, not the judgeship altogether.174  These reasons may be 
why Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in White suggested that re-
cusals are the preferred method of dealing with troubling comments 
made by the judges and candidates.175  And it may be why in interpret-
ing White, some courts have assumed that recusals are the constitu-
tionally permissible alternatives to the canons.176 
It could also be that recusals are narrowly tailored to the poten-
tially compelling interest of judicial impartiality, in a way that the an-
nounce clause in White was not.177  Indeed, in the highest courts of 
two states, New York,178 and Florida,179 even traditional pledge clause 
canons, not dissimilar from the one mentioned in White, have passed 
muster under strict scrutiny.  The Florida Supreme Court held that it 
is “beyond dispute that [the Canon] serves a compelling state inter-
est[:]”  It preserves the “integrity” of the judiciary as “it would be in-
consistent with our system of government if a judicial candidate could 
campaign on a platform that he or she would automatically give more 
credence to the testimony of certain witnesses or rule in a predeter-
mined manner.”180  The canon was also narrowly tailored, the court 
found, because it allowed the candidate to state his personal views on 
 
174 There are two strands to this argument.  First, because recusals are not direct regulations 
of speech, they may be deemed incidental.  See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fun-
damental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1996).  Second, they may be content-
neutral, so they would not get the same scrutiny that the state canon did in White.  See Da-
vid K. Stott, Zero-Sum Judicial Elections:  Balancing Free Speech and Impartiality Through Recusal 
Reform, 2009 BYU L. REV. 481, 512 (2009). 
175 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[The state] may adopt recusal stan-
dards more rigorous than due process requires, and censure judges who violate these 
standards.  What Minnesota may not do, however, is censor what people hear as they un-
dertake to decide for themselves which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary judi-
cial officer.”). 
176 See, e.g., In re Enforcement of Rule 2.03, Canon 5.B.(1)(c) (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (“Recus-
al, or other remedial action, may nonetheless be required of any judge in cases that in-
volve an issue about which the judge has announced his or her views as otherwise may be 
appropriate under the Code of Judicial Conduct.”). 
177 See Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualifications or Suppression:  Due Process and the Response to 
Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 570 (2004) (discussing the “possibility 
of creating speech codes more closely tailored to prevent due process conflicts”). 
178 In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 1 (N.Y. 2003). 
179 In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 77 (Fla. 2003).  The canon, that the court described as more 
“narrow,” provided in part:  “A candidate for judicial office . . . shall not:  (i) make 
pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial perfor-
mance of the duties of the office; [or] (ii) make statements that commit or appear to 
commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come 
before the court.”  Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 7A(3)(d)(i)-(ii). 
180 In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 87. 
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disputed issues.181  Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals in In re 
Watson upheld its state’s canon under strict scrutiny, observing that 
“[j]udges must apply the law faithfully and impartially—they are not 
elected to aid particular groups, be it the police, the prosecution or 
the defense bar.  Campaign promises that suggest otherwise gravely 
risk distorting public perception of the judicial role.”182 
Reminded by these decisions, it is not difficult to imagine how an 
expansive recusal standard would pass strict scrutiny; after all, it 
would target the same concerns and serve the same interests hig-
hlighted by the New York and Florida courts.  Indeed, at least one 
federal court has held that a recusal statute satisfied strict scrutiny.183  
But triggering the strict scrutiny review is in and of itself a signal that 
there are major First Amendment considerations.184 
Finally, a plausible argument can be made that recusals, given that 
they burden speech incidentally, are not subject to strict scrutiny.185  
In United States v. O’Brien, the Court announced a four-prong, inter-
mediate-like test for laws that have the effect of restricting speech 
even if they do not aim at expression directly.186  As mentioned pre-
viously, recusal standards do not forbid speech, but whether they tar-
get speech directly, is a matter of debate.187  Assuming they do not—
likely a dubious assumption given that it is precisely speech that 
would trigger a restriction (recusal) rather than a noncommunicative 
act like in O’Brien—and the O’Brien test applies rather than strict scru-
tiny, they are still an indication that there are major First Amendment 
 
181 Id. (holding that “a candidate may state his or her personal views, even on disputed is-
sues”). 
182 In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 1. 
183 Family Trust Found., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 706 (E.D. Ky. 2004) (holding 
that a recusal canon and statute are narrowly tailored enough to accomplish a compelling 
state interest, thereby passing a test of strict scrutiny). 
184 See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (observing that it is a “rare case” 
where a law survives strict scrutiny). 
185 See Dorf, supra note 174, at 1178; Stott, supra note 174, at 504 (citing United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–78 (1968)); cf. Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 200 (6th Cir. 
2010) (rejecting argument that free speech challenge to judicial cannon should be eva-
luated under intermediate scrutiny to “balance[] the competing fundamental rights of 
some judicial candidates (who have a right to engage in campaign speech) and some liti-
gants (who have a right to an impartial judiciary)” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
186 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (opining that the law must be within the constitutional power of 
the government, furthering a substantial interest, which is unrelated to the suppression of 
free speech, and the incidental restriction on the first amendment freedoms must be no 
greater than necessary). 
187 Since such a standard would presumably list the type of speech that would disqualify a 
judge from presiding over a case, it seems that it is speech rather than some other, non-
expressive conduct that is targeted. 
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concerns.188  Indeed, the purpose of intermediate scrutiny is to give 
the government “latitude in designing a regulatory” scheme rather 
than a conclusion that there are no constitutional concerns.189 
Thus, whatever Justice Kennedy’s reasons may be for embracing 
recusals, this form of regulation means that political speech is bur-
dened, chilled, and possibly directly targeted, giving rise to weighty 
constitutional concerns that may even merit the highest level of judi-
cial scrutiny when examining legislation.  Since this standard ema-
nates from Caperton rather than a statute or canon, the Court is with-
out its most effective tool to ensure that “political 
speech . . . prevail[s] against laws that would suppress it by design or 
inadvertence”—strict scrutiny.190  In order to ensure that First 
Amendment rights are fairly weighed against litigants’ due process 
protections, a careful balancing test should be applied. 
IV.  RE-THINKING RECUSAL CHALLENGES:  TOWARDS A NEW 
FRAMEWORK 
As explained in more detail above, Caperton’s analysis and holding 
may be read to apply in cases that do not involve financial contribu-
tions.  Indeed, “probability of bias” is as likely born out of a judicial 
candidate’s speech against a litigant as it is out of a campaign contri-
bution, as the Caperton dissent points out.  As a result, courts must al-
so be prepared to weigh First Amendment considerations.  Aside 
from the right to receive money—a right that has not yet been recog-
nized by the Court191—there are weighty concerns identified by White.  
The moment a state institutes judicial elections, the First Amendment 
attaches, and judicial candidates have the right to announce their 
views.192  And if Caperton motions begin to mandate recusals, then 
speech may be burdened in a constitutionally intolerable way.  This 
burden does not come from legislation, so the court would be left 
without its most powerful tool—strict scrutiny.  Precisely for all these 
reasons, the due process test developed in Mathews is the perfect an-
tidote:  While weighing the litigant’s right to due process, it would 
 
188 See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 53 (2006) 
(characterizing the O’Brien decision as an instance where even expressive conduct was 
deemed deserving of First Amendment protection). 
189 See Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 520 U.S. 180, 213–14 (1997). 
190 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 882 (2010). 
191 See Dean v. Blumenthal, 577 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing nominal damages in 
cases of violations of constitutionally protected rights). 
192 See U.S. CONST. amend I; Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (hold-
ing that the announce clause violates the First Amendment). 
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consider the First Amendment as well as the integrity of the judicial 
system, producing a constitutionally hygienic outcome. 
A.  Mathews v. Eldridge and the Reach of Its Balancing Test 
Mathews requires courts to balance three factors in determining 
whether the procedures employed in a particular situation comport 
with the Due Process Clause.193  The first factor is the private interest 
at stake—that is, the precise nature of the life, liberty, or property in-
terest that risks deprivation.194  The second factor is the “risk of an er-
roneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional substitute procedural sa-
feguards.”195  Courts will balance these two factors against the third 
factor, which is the government or public interest, “including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”196  The 
Court has used somewhat ambiguous language to describe this last 
factor,197 which might vary considerably depending on the nature of 
the case.198 
 
193 Commentators have analogized the three-factor Mathews test to the three-factor negli-
gence formula famously described by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Tow-
ing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
194 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) (describing the first factor as “the pri-
vate interest that will be affected by the official action . . . .”).  These interests vary widely, 
and might consist of one’s freedom from government confinement, see, e.g., Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), or one’s interest in fair procedures prior to issuing a pre-
judgment attachment order, see, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991). 
195 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
196 Id. 
197 See Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11 (noting “any ancillary interest the government may have in pro-
viding the procedure or forgoing the added burden”). 
198 See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 466 (D.D.C. 2005) (not-
ing the government’s interest as “national security” under the third prong of Mathews).  
Although Mathews speaks in terms of the “government interest,” the Court has made clear 
that in a private action, this may include the other private adversary’s interest.  See And-
rew Blair-Stanek, Twombly is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v. Eldridge Test to Discov-
ery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2010).  In Doehr, the Court held that the state statute ran 
afoul of due process because it allowed prejudgment attachment of real estate without 
notice and hearing.  501 U.S. at 10.  This case was significant in that it applied Mathews in 
a case that “pitted private interests against other private interests”; it did not involve a di-
rect challenge to government action as in Mathews itself.  See Blair-Stanek, supra at 12–14.  
The Court in Doehr adapted the test to “private civil litigants’ use of the court system.”  
Blair-Stanek, supra at 12. 
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Although developed in the administrative law context, courts have 
imported the Mathews test into many other areas of the law.199  It is 
simply not true that the Mathews test is applied only to weigh adequa-
cy of administrative procedures when property interests are at stake, 
although this is a significant area where Mathews is applied.  For ex-
ample, the Court applied the Mathews test in weighing a company’s 
due process right after an agency ordered immediate reinstatement 
of a fired employee with back pay.200  Additionally, Mathews has been 
applied in civil adjudication.  In United States v. James Daniel Good Real 
Property, the Court applied Mathews to hold that the government gen-
erally may not use an ex parte civil forfeiture proceeding to seize real 
property.201  This case came two years after Doehr, where the Court 
used Mathews to hold that a state statute ran afoul of due process be-
cause it allowed prejudgment attachment of real estate without notice 
and hearing.202 
It is important to note that although the Mathews test has been 
applied in many contexts,203 the Court has “never viewed Mathews as 
announcing an all–embracing test for deciding due process claims.”204  
Indeed, the Supreme Court has carved out certain areas where a dif-
ferent test should apply.205  For instance, in Medina v. California,206 the 
Supreme Court held that the Mathews test is not sufficiently deferen-
tial in the area of criminal procedure and process, namely in allocat-
ing burdens of proof.  Likewise, the Supreme Court in Weiss v. United 
States held that the Mathews test is not appropriate for reviewing deci-
sions by a military court because in the military context “[j]udicial de-
ference . . . is at its apogee when reviewing congressional decision-
 
199 See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 (relying on Mathews to hold that a citizen labeled as an 
“enemy-combatant” was entitled to received notice of the factual basis for his classifica-
tion and challenge it before a neutral decision-maker). 
200 Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 262 (1987). 
201 510 U.S. 43, 53–55 (1993). 
202 501 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1991). 
203 Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1351 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that the Ma-
thews test is the “orthodox” method of evaluating procedural due process claims). 
204 Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002). 
205 See, e.g., id. at 167 (stating that when evaluating adequacy of method used to give notice, a 
more “straightforward test of reasonableness” has been used). 
206 505 U.S. 437, 445–46 (1992).  But see Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 
2332 n.3 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opining that whether Mathews applies when eva-
luating state procedures for allowing state inmates access to new evidence is not necessari-
ly foreclosed by Medina); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (applying the Ma-
thews standard to weigh the standard of proof necessary to terminate parental rights for 
neglect); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (applying Mathews by a unanim-
ous Court to find that a “clear and convincing evidence” was the minimum evidentiary 
standard required to commit someone to a mental health facility). 
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making.”207  Taken together, these cases suggest that the court does 
not apply Mathews when one interest at stake is so weighty that the 
court should give deference to that interest and not balance it with 
others.  These areas, however, are narrow, and have been interpreted 
as such.  For instance, in Krimstock v. Kelly, the Second Circuit re-
jected the argument that Mathews is inapplicable in criminal cases; 
Medina, the court explained, dealt only with constitutional guarantees 
in criminal proceedings regarding burdens of proof.208 
B.  Mathews Meets Caperton 
Caperton fundamentally changed the interplay between judicial re-
cusal (and judicial elections) and the Constitution.  Given the uncer-
tainty over the reach of Caperton and the constitutional freedoms it 
potentially implicates, courts should use the Mathews test to deter-
mine whether the Due Process Clause requires recusal.  Although 
one might struggle in vain to reconcile the Supreme Court’s varied 
use of the Mathews test, a review of the policies underlying many of 
the cases using Mathews supports the notion of applying Mathews in 
the context of judicial recusal.  In some ways, applying Mathews in this 
context is more compelling than anywhere else:  The test not only al-
lows the court to carefully arrive at a fair result, but it holds Caperton 
together, with its principles intact.  That is, it would allow the courts 
to confront the tension between due process and First Amendment 
rights without judging whether the case is sufficiently “extreme”—an 
exercise that was derided by the Chief Justice in Caperton’s dissent.209 
1.  Applying Mathews Is Appropriate 
First, it is worth noting that simply because Mathews has not, to 
date, been applied by the Supreme Court to recusal challenges does 
not mean that it cannot be applied.  Those that argue Mathews cannot 
be applied in this context contend that the Supreme Court’s recusal 
jurisprudence evinces a deliberate absence of any citation to Ma-
thews.210  Although this argument cannot be discounted, it is by no 
 
207 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
208 464 F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir. 2006). 
209 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2272–74 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissent-
ing). 
210 See Friedland, supra note 177, at 575 n.48; John A. Meiser, Note, The (Non) Problem of a 
Limited Due Process Right to Judicial Disqualification, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1799, 1820 
(2009). 
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means controlling.211  The Supreme Court has never suggested that 
Mathews cannot be applied to recusal challenges under the Due 
Process Clause, and, in fact, one federal district court recently cited 
Mathews in this regard.212  Moreover, importing Mathews into this con-
text is consistent with the Supreme Court’s “deep—and growing—
attachment to the Mathews test.”213  Recently, the Court in Hamdi re-
lied on the Mathews test to hold that a citizen labeled by the govern-
ment as an “enemy-combatant” was entitled to receive notice of the 
factual basis for his classification and challenge it before a neutral de-
cision-maker.214  The argument in favor of applying Mathews in this 
context is more persuasive in light of additional factors raised by Ca-
perton that must be balanced with a litigant’s due process rights. 
Additionally, applying Mathews would not be that ground-breaking 
because its balancing test has been applied in circumstances analog-
ous to judicial recusals.  Many of the cases challenging administrative 
procedures occur in the context of adjudications and demonstrate 
courts’ willingness to scrutinize the components of adjudications that 
contribute to a fair outcome, including the identity of the decision 
maker.  For instance, in Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., the Supreme Court 
considered a challenge to a federal statutory scheme that remitted all 
penalties for violations of federal labor laws to the federal agency that 
imposed penalties.215  The statute was challenged under the Due 
Process Clause on the basis that it created an impermissible risk of bi-
as by encouraging the agency to impose “unduly numerous and large 
assessments of civil penalties.”216  The Court upheld the statute, refus-
ing to apply the “strict requirements of judicial neutrality” to the de-
terminations of an administrative prosecutor.217  The Court then cited 
Mathews for the proposition that “the neutrality requirement helps to 
 
211 Cf. Chen v. Gonzales, 177 F. App’x 159, 160 (2d Cir. 2006); Article II Gun Shop, Inc. v. 
Gonzales, 441 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2006); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 
1068 (9th Cir. 2002); Shinn v. Champion Mortg. Co., No. 09-CV-0013, 2010 WL 500410, 
at *7 n.4 (D.N.J. Feb. 5, 2010). 
212 Fieger v. Ferry, No. 04-60089, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71274 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2007) 
(citing Mathews in considering whether state recusal standards comport with due 
process). 
213 See Blair-Stanek, supra note 198, at 12; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781 
(2008); City of L.A. v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 717 (2003) (applying Mathews to city proce-
dures following the towing of a resident’s car). 
214 542 U.S. 507, 532–33 (2004). 
215 446 U.S. 238, 239 (1980). 
216 Id. at 241–42. 
217 Id. at 250. 
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guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis 
of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law.”218 
Similarly, as Connecticut v. Doehr suggests, Mathews is often used to 
evaluate the fairness of state and federal judicial proceedings.  For in-
stance, where the Supreme Court has had to weigh the adequacy of 
judicial process for a criminal defendant, it has chosen to use the Ma-
thews test.  In United States v. Raddatz, the Court considered whether 
due process permits a district judge to rule on a motion to suppress 
based only on the record made by a magistrate judge.219  The Court 
applied the Mathews test without analysis, as if Mathews were the de-
fault test.220  Other examples in this regard include Parham v. J.R., 
where the Court used Mathews to evaluate the constitutionality of a 
procedure that allowed parents to commit their children to a mental 
health facility.221 
Similarly, in the famous case of Lassiter v. Department of Social Ser-
vices, the Court employed Mathews to determine whether due process 
requires the state to provide an indigent parent with counsel in a 
proceeding to terminate her parental rights.222 
And, as noted above, the Court recently applied Mathews to de-
termine whether a citizen held as an “enemy-combatant” was entitled 
to receive notice of the factual basis for his classification and chal-
lenge it before a neutral decision-maker.223  As these cases show, Ma-
thews has been applied in various contexts, most noteworthy of which 
include cases where individual rights were weighed against the state, 
in criminal cases, and where the fairness of the decision-maker was at 
stake—all important components of cases where Caperton motions will 
be made.  Just as importantly, Mathews has been called the default test 
and one that involves the most careful balancing of rights. 
2.  Applying Mathews Is Good Policy 
The benefit of applying the Mathews test to recusal motions is that 
it preserves existing precedent, while providing the flexibility neces-
 
218 Id. at 242.  Although the Court thought it relevant that the agency acted more as a prose-
cutor than a judge, the case nonetheless demonstrates that the Court has at least used 
Mathews in the context of challenging the impartiality of a decision-maker. 
219 447 U.S. 667, 677 (1980). 
220 Id. 
221 442 U.S. 584, 599–600 (1979). 
222 452 U.S. 18 (1981).  The Court weighed the complexity of the proceeding and the capac-
ity of the parent to weigh the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a parent’s right.  Id. at 
31–32. 
223 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532–33 (2004). 
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sary to address new concerns raised by Caperton.  Put another way, 
Mathews is a natural outgrowth of existing recusal precedent and will 
allow courts to respond to the myriad issues that might arise in the 
future. 
In cases raising pre-Caperton concerns, such as direct pecuniary in-
terest224 and personal animosity,225 Mathews will generally leave the ex-
isting legal landscape unchanged.  These types of cases have focused 
on the specific rights of individuals to fair tribunals,226 rather on the 
more macro-issues like the public or government interest.  Courts 
have sometimes found that the individual right to a fair tribunal is so 
strong and no countervailing interest exists that the cases are not sus-
ceptible to balancing.227  While this may initially seem to mitigate 
against applying Mathews, a closer examination shows otherwise; even 
if Mathews were applied, the cases would likely come out the same 
way, since the first two factors—individual interest and risk of an er-
roneous deprivation—would likely outweigh the public interest, 
which in any case would be either small or completely in line with the 
public interest (i.e., to vindicate the litigant’s due process rights).228 
With regard to motions raising Caperton concerns—including 
campaign contributions, “prior speeches and writings” of the judge, 
or other factors that give rise to an objective appearance of bias,229 a 
flexible approach is needed.  Caperton motions implicate two compet-
ing interests:  The First Amendment and the Due Process Clause.230  
Since, as discussed above, Caperton may invite lower courts to expand 
its holding into new areas in which there exists an objective appear-
ance of bias, including extra-judicial speech, the case risks chilling 
the speech of judges who seek to avoid disqualification.  As one 
commentator noted, “[j]udicial elections present a dilemma for can-
didates because their desire to say things that might win votes clashes 
with their duty to ensure due process.”231  Indeed, Justice O’Connor 
 
224 See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927). 
225 See, e.g., Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971). 
226 See supra notes 44–65 and accompanying text. 
227 See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992). 
228 Cf. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 111–12 (1973) 
(noting the public interest in fairness). 
229 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2268 (2009) (emphasis in original). 
230 See Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on Crime:  How Campaigns for State Judiciary Violate 
Criminal Defendants’ Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101, 1120-21 (2006). 
231 See Shepard, supra note 4, at 24. 
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goes so far as to argue that judicial elections as an institution under-
mine the public interest in appearance of a fair tribunal.232 
The fact of judicial elections challenges the deeply-rooted idea in 
American law that a decision-maker must be neutral—that is, not 
committed to an outcome before the parties present their arguments.  
But many candidates for judicial office, for example, often campaign 
on ‘tough-on-crime’ platforms, and “jockey for the position of who 
will treat defendants more harshly.”233  Once elected, political pres-
sure may persuade the judge to treat criminal defendants in a man-
ner that pleases the electorate, rather than in a way that would dis-
pense justice to the defendant.234  This contravenes the important 
counter-majoritarian benefit of judicial review, which exists to protect 
individual rights against the majority.235 
Adding fuel to the fire, White opens the door for—indeed encou-
rages—the type of speech that would undermine a litigant’s right to 
due process.  First, White allows judicial candidates to announce their 
views and to criticize decisions.236  Even if a state has the (arguably) 
constitutional promise clause—forbidding judicial candidates from 
making specific promises on how they would rule in future cases—the 
practical effect of White is permitting candidates to announce con-
crete views on issues that will likely come before them as judges.  It 
does not take much for the electorate to make the connection be-
tween one’s views and one’s actions after donning the robe.237  Should 
 
232 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 792 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring). 
233 See Weiss, supra note 230, at 1105 (citing numerous examples of similar campaign plat-
forms). 
234 Scott D. Wiener, Popular Justice:  State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 199, 200 n.97, 201 (1996). 
235 See id. at 206 n.123. 
236 See White, 536 U.S. at 765. 
237 As Justice Ginsburg, in dissent in White, explained: 
Uncoupled from the Announce Clause, the ban on pledges or promises is easily 
circumvented.  By prefacing a campaign commitment with the caveat, ‘although I 
cannot promise anything,’ or by simply avoiding the language of promises or 
pledges altogether, a candidate could declare with impunity how she would decide 
specific issues.  Semantic sanitizing of the candidate’s commitment would not, 
however, diminish its pernicious effects on actual and perceived judicial impartial-
ity.  To use the Court’s example, a candidate who campaigns by saying, ‘If elected, 
I will vote to uphold the legislature’s power to prohibit same-sex marriages,’ will 
feel scarcely more pressure to honor that statement than the candidate who stands 
behind a podium and tells a throng of cheering supporters:  ‘I think it is constitu-
tional for the legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages.’  Made during a cam-
paign, both statements contemplate a quid pro quo between candidate and voter.  
Both effectively ‘bind [the candidate] to maintain that position after election.’  
And both convey the impression of a candidate prejudging an issue to win votes.  
Contrary to the Court’s assertion, the ‘nonpromissory’ statement averts none of 
the dangers posed by the ‘promissory’ one. 
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the judge fail to live up to his words as a candidate, he will be pu-
nished at the polls next time around.  The next candidate will make 
the same “announcements” (dare we say promises?) and be sure to 
live up to them.  And so it goes. 
Second, as discussed in more detail earlier, White has encouraged 
organizations, mostly of conservative stripes, to issue detailed ques-
tionnaires about the judicial candidate’s or judge’s thoughts on hot-
button issues, such as abortion.  If the candidate was reluctant to an-
nounce his positions before, he may have little choice now, as more 
than enough rivals will eagerly put their views on paper.  And if the 
candidate was oddly open-minded before, he will be encouraged, or 
at least perceived to be, more committed now.  The result is that in 
states where judges are elected, few litigants will walk into a cour-
troom, expecting due process, but face a judge who has not been on 
record announcing his stance on a legal issue.  If that issue is being 
adjudicated in the litigant’s case, he can hardly expect anything like 
the due process our Constitution guarantees.238 
In contrast to cases like Medina v. California239 and Weiss v. United 
States,240 no one interest is so weighty in this context to preclude use 
of Mathews.241  Both the protections of procedural due process and 
the First Amendment are important individual rights that cannot de-
fer to one another as a matter of law in the same way that certain in-
terests may yield to the deference of the military.  Instead of creating 
rigid rules, the tension between procedural due process and the First 
Amendment is best settled through a flexible balancing approach 
under the circumstances.242 
By using the Mathews test, courts will adequately balance these of-
ten-competing interests.  The first factor is “the private interest that 
 
  536 U.S. at 819–20 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
238 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2252 (2009). 
239 505 U.S. 437 (1992). 
240 510 U.S. 163 (1994). 
241 Justice Stevens made this point in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, 
North Carolina, where in his dissent he opined:   
The issue [of having counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding] is 
one of fundamental fairness, not of weighing the pecuniary costs against the so-
cietal benefits.  Accordingly, even if the costs to the State were not relatively insig-
nificant but rather were just as great as the costs of providing prosecutors, judges, 
and defense counsel to ensure the fairness of criminal proceedings, I would reach 
the same result in this category of cases.  For the value of protecting our liberty 
from deprivation by the State without due process of law is priceless.   
  452 U.S. 18, 60 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
242 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–25 (2005) (applying Mathews to determine 
what process is due to an inmate because due process in this situation calls for a flexible 
approach). 
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will be affected by the official action.”243  In this regard, courts may 
ask, among other things, what the litigant may stand to gain or lose in 
the action;244 whether it is a criminal or civil matter; and whether, in a 
criminal case, the defendant is charged with a felony or misdemea-
nor.245  The second factor is the “risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional substitute procedural safeguards.”246  The weight of 
this factor depends on the precise circumstances of the case, but the 
inquiry will generally look to the degree of potential bias, i.e. the 
greater the objective appearance of impropriety, the more weight this 
factor holds. 
Against these two factors courts will balance the public interest.  
In addition to the public interest in procedural fairness, the public 
also has an interest in protecting the First Amendment.247  As the Su-
preme Court has held, “[t]he First Amendment creates an open mar-
ketplace where ideas, most especially political ideas, may compete 
without government interference.248  If recusal burdens speech, then 
affording too much weight to a litigant’s due process rights may in-
fringe upon the presiding judge’s right to speak outside the cour-
troom, including on the campaign trail, thus harming the market-
place of ideas.  And even if recusal does not burden speech, the 
public still has an important interest in permitting the presiding 
judge to speak his views outside the courtroom,249 especially if the 
state has made a determination to permit judicial elections. 
Additionally, separate and apart from these First Amendment 
concerns, courts may consider other factors that weigh into the pub-
lic interest.  As suggested by the Caperton dissent, the case raises the 
prospect of a flood of non-meritorious recusal motions,250 which 
 
243 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1975). 
244 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985) (noting that the 
individual interest in retaining employment is significant, given the severity of depriving 
one of a livelihood). 
245 See Rachel S. Weiss, Note, Defining the Contours of United States v. Hensley:  Limiting the Use 
of Terry Stops for Completed Misdemeanors, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1321, 1339–41 (2009) (noting 
the common law roots of the felony/misdemeanor distinction). 
246 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
247 See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (opining that “the impor-
tance of protecting freedom of speech is to foster the marketplace of ideas.  If speech, 
even unconventional speech that some find lacking in substance or offensive, is allowed 
to compete unrestricted in the marketplace of ideas, truth will be discovered”). 
248 N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008). 
249 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting 
the public interest in the “free flow of information”). 
250 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266 (2009) (“As such, it is worth 
noting the effects, or lack thereof, of the Court’s prior decisions.  Even though the stan-
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would operate to undermine public confidence in the impartiality of 
the judiciary.  As a result, courts may consider specific grounds for 
recusal in light of the public interest in maintaining the integrity of 
the judiciary by discouraging non-meritorious recusal motions.251  
Additionally, the public has an interest in preventing litigants from 
gaming the system.  Since the opposite of gratitude is revenge, a po-
tential litigant might purposefully oppose a judge’s election cam-
paign for the purpose of later making a motion to disqualify the 
judge under Caperton.252  Allowing courts to take situations like this in-
to account under the public interest, Mathews would operate to dis-
courage such a practice, thus bolstering the integrity of the judicial 
system. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The merits of judicial elections have been litigated in journals 
around the country.253  In light of the recent Supreme Court decisions 
in White and Caperton, this debate will only intensify.  Rather than re-
visit the arguments for and against electing judges, this Article has ar-
gued that applying the Mathews test in cases where a litigant’s due 
process is threatened by an elected judge—a possibility that the Court 
initially dismissed in White against Justice Ginsburg’s protests,254 and 
then took head on in Caperton—will balance First Amendment rights 
that judicial elections breed against the rights of the litigants that the 
Constitution protects.  This test would also be mindful of the larger 
concern voiced by the Caperton dissent:  That Caperton motions will 
undermine the integrity of the judiciary.  In sum, the flexibility and 
elegance of the test in this context is also made timely in light of the 
uncertainty raised by the Court’s expansive rulings in the areas of 
 
dards announced in those cases raised questions similar to those that might be asked af-
ter our decision today, the Court was not flooded with Monroeville or Murchison motions.  
That is perhaps due in part to the extreme facts those standards sought to address.  
Courts proved quite capable of applying the standards to less extreme situations.”). 
251 Cf. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 129 S. Ct 1093, 1099 (2009) (noting, in another con-
text, the state’s interest in preserving the integrity of its electoral system). 
252 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 32–33, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 
(2009) (No. 08-22). 
253 Indeed, the topic of judicial election is the single most written about topic in academia.  
See Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State Judges:  The Role of 
Popular Judicial Elections, 40 SW. L.J. 31, 31 (1986); Pozen, supra note 162, at 269. 
254 See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 813 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) (“This judicial obligation to avoid prejudgment corresponds to the litigant’s 
right, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to ‘an impar-
tial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.’”) (citation omitted). 
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judicial elections, due process protection, and First Amendment 
rights.  Lower courts should be relieved that they would not need to 
break new ground to apply Mathews in this context.  And the Chief 
Justice’s prediction that the Court will have to revisit Caperton to 
measure the “extremeness” of the facts in future cases may not come 
true after all.255 
 
255 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2273 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“I believe we will come to regret 
this decision as well, when courts are forced to deal with a wide variety of Caperton mo-
tions, each claiming the title of ‘most extreme’ or ‘most disproportionate.’”). 
